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ARTICLES
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY UNDER SUPERFUND:
CORPORATE VEIL OR VALE OF TEARS?
Rita Cain*
Indisputably, harmful solid waste must be removed from our environment
where it has been dumped. This pressing societal need was addressed when
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). I The Act's broad remedial purpose has been
asserted to support personal liability for shareholders of corporate defendants
prosecuted under CERCLA. Such an approach, however, may be indefensible
under the statute.
This article analyzes the confused state of the law regarding shareholder
liability under Superfund. Section I briefly explains the history of Superfund and
other pertinent environmental protection statutes. Section II addresses the Superfund liability scheme. Section III analyzes cases that have decided the issue of
shareholder liability under Superfund. Finally, the article concludes with recommendations on how shareholder liability should be addressed in the future.
I.

BACKGROUND: FEDERAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The United States Code includes a variety of provisions to prevent and
2
penalize industrial pollution of the environment. For example, the Clean Air Act
seeks to reduce air pollution by establishing maximum levels for certain air
pollutants, such as lead and carbon monoxide.3 Similarly, under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 4 the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
issues permits to any point source of water pollution.' The EPA then imposes
increasingly stricter effluent limitations on these permittees. 6 The Resource Conservation and Recover Act ("RCRA") regulates disposal of solid waste onto
land, by requiring, among other things, detailed record keeping regarding waste
pickup and disposal. 7 All of these statutes provide for daily civil penalties and
* Assistant Professor of Law and Administration, Henry W. Bloch School of Business and
Public Administration, University of Missouri-Kansas City.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1986) [hereinafter Superfund, CERCLA, or the Act].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1986).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1986). See also 40 C.F.R. § 50.4-50.12 (1988).
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1986) (also known as the "Clean Water Act").
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1986).
6. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1986). The original water pollution permit law was the River
and Harbors Act of 1899, which required a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers before
discharging refuse into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-26m (1986). The River and Harbors Act,
however, did not allow for discharge limits to be linked to the permits, which necessitated the Clean
Water Act limit scheme. Exec. Order No. 11,574 (1970). See also 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1986).
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criminal sanctions for violations.' None of these statutes, however, provides
automatic personal liability for shareholders of corporations found liable under
the law. 9
The RCRA manifest system was intended to provide a "cradle to grave"
scheme for regulating hazardous waste, by regulating waste generators, trans-

porters, treaters, storers, and disposers. RCRA also regulates the operations of

waste disposal sites through an EPA permit system for dump site operators.' 0
Unfortunately, RCRA had no mechanism for responding to environmental harm
from past careless solid waste disposal." In response to this statutory deficiency,
2
Congress passed CERCLA.'
CERCLA authorizes the President to respond to actual or threatened releases
of hazardous substances into the environment. t3 The Act also requires the EPA
to create a national contingency plan, which establishes "procedures and standards
for responding to releases of hazardous substances ....
-4 Cleanup costs and
procedures may be funded through Superfund, the provisions of which mandate
a separate account accumulated from surcharges on toxic chemicals, as they are
produced, and on some petroleum products. 5 Although Superfund is available
for cleanup payment, the Act clearly establishes that ultimate financial liability
for cleanup be borne by several responsible parties. These CERCLA liability
provisions are discussed next.
ff.

OVERVIEW: SUPERFUND CLEANUP LIABILITY.

CERCLA identifies several parties who may be liable to clean up facilities
from which there is or may be a hazardous release into the environment.' 6 These
responsible parties include current owners and operators of the hazardous facility,
as well as owners and operators at the time when the hazardous wastes were
discarded at the facility.' 7 Also responsible are persons who contractually arranged
8. See generally S. BRiGauM, G. GOLDMAN, D. SQUIRE, D. WEINBERG, HAZARDOUS WASTE
A PRAcTIcAL GUIDE To RCRA AND SUPERFJND 235-39 (1985) [hereinafter

REGULATION HANDBOOK:

HANDBOOK].

9.

See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988).

10.

R. FORTUNA AND D. LENNETT, HAzARDOUs WASTE REGULATION, A NEw ERA 9 (1987).

11. See HANDBOOK at 4.
12. Id. See also 126 Cong. Rec. 30,930-31 (1980) (S.Randolph); 126 Cong. Rec. 31,972-73
(1980) (R. Vento).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1986). In conjunction, the EPA is authorized to seek injunctions in
federal court to force a responsible party to clean up any site or spill that presents an imminent and
substantial danger to public health or welfare or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1986).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1986). This portion of the national contingency plan is known as the
national hazardous substance response plan.

15. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1976), repealed by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"), which extended the EPA's authority under the original statute and expanded the tax to
more general business activities and to gasoline. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The term
"Superfund" has come to refer not just to the accumulated cleanup fund, but to the statute itself.
"Superfund" is used in that more generic sense herein.
16. A "facility" is defined as: "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon,
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft or (B) any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1986).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(l)-(2) (1986). The act expressly excludes from the definition of
responsible owners or operators those persons, who without participating in the management of the
facility hold indicia of ownership primarily to a protect security interest in the facility. 42 U.S.C. §
9601(20)(A) (1986). See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.

1990]

Shareholder Liability Under Superfund

for disposal or treatment of their hazardous waste or who arranged with a
transporter for transport of their waste for disposal or treatment." Finally, the
transporter who accepts hazardous wastes, for transport to a facility of the
transporter's choosing, is liable when there is a release or threatened release from
the facility. 9
A responsible party may be liable for all costs associated with waste removal

or remedial action at the site, incurred by the United States, a state or others,
as long as the response or remedy is not inconsistent with the EPA's national
contingency plan. 2° The responsible party also may be liable for injury to,

destruction of, or loss of natural resources, as well as the cost of assessing such

injury.2' A party who is ordered to remove or respond to a site or spill that is

creating an imminent or substantial danger 22 will be liable for punitive damages
for failure to respond as ordered. Punitive damages will be three times the cost

incurred by the government as a result of the responsible party's failure to
respond. 23

The statutory responsible parties will be strictly liable for the applicable
response costs.2 Further, all responsible parties are jointly and severally liable
for the entire cost of cleanup. 25 Thus, the United States or a state can pursue its

action for response costs against any or all responsible parties. If the government
recovers from fewer than all the responsible parties, those prosecuted can seek
26
contribution from the others.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1986). This category of responsible parties often is referred to as
waste generators.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1986).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1986). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text regarding
the national contingency plan. The propriety of the government's remedial response often is the
subject of protracted litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F. Supp.
391, 396-398 (W.D. Mo. 1985) [hereinafter CCC]. The responsible parties have the burden of proving
the government's response costs are not consistent with the national contingency plan. See United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter NEPACCO I].
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1986). The NEPACCO II Court, 810 F.2d at 749, affirmed a
lower court conclusion that the government's recoverable response costs include salaries and expenses
associated with monitoring and assessing the environmental threat, as well as litigation expenses of
the EPA and Department of Justice, attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest. See United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
[hereinafter NEPACCO ] (In 1989, the EPA declared the Denney farm, the dumpsite at issue in the
NEPACCO cases, as well as seven other sites all in southwestern Missouri, to be free of all of the
highly toxic chemical dioxin. See Kansas City Times, May 5, 1989, at BI).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1986).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1986).
24. CERCLA states that liability under the Act will be "construed to be the same standard of
liability which obtains under section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution control Act." 42 U.S.C. §
9601(32) (1986). Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1986), has been interpreted
to require strict liability. See Giblin and Kelly, Judicial Development of Standards of Liability in
Government Enforcement Actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, 33 CL~v. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1985).
25. Rallison, The Threat to Investment in the Hazardous Waste Industry: An Analysis of
Individual and Corporate Shareholder Liability under CERCLA, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 585, 591-92,
595-96 [hereinafter Rallison].
26. See Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D.
Cal. 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stephan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
But see Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Az. 1984) (denied
contribution based on the doctrine of unclean hands).
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The Superfund scheme thus emphasizes cleanup first. Subsequently, financial

responsibility for cleanup is determined, with the government enjoying broad
powers to recover from third parties. Recently, the government has extended its

recovery claims to shareholders of site owners 27 and to officers of generators.2
What is contentious, therefore, is the assessment of CERCLA liability for
shareholders of CERCLA site owners or operators.
11.

SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA WITHOUT
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL?

Generally, before a shareholder of a defendant corporation is liable for any
damage-causing activities of the company, the courts must pierce the corporate
veil. 29 Courts have held, however, that the shareholders of companies that owned

Contribution from other responsible parties is supported by the language in the "responsible
parties" section of CERCLA which allows for recovery of response costs incurred by the United
State, or by a state, or by any other person. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1986) (emphasis added).
Thus, responsible parties who incur expense for cleanup have a concurrent right to contribution for
the costs they incur. This right to contribution is qualified, as is the government's recovery right;
only necessary costs consistent with the national contingency plan may be recovered. See CCC, 628
F. Supp. at 405.
In allocating liability among multiple responsible parties, the courts may consider degree of fault,
extent of knowledge, and control. See Tisdale, Current Issues in Superfund Litigation, in HAzARDous
WAsTE LMoAnoN (1985).

27. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985). Unfortunately, the
courts often cite generator cases to support personal liability for shareholders of site owners and
operators. See, e.g., infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
The case authority for generator liability, however, is inapplicable to owner/operator liability.
In Ward, the Ward Transformer Company ("WTC"), purchased, rebuilt and sold electrical transformers and generated polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") oil in the process. Robert Ward, Jr. was
the president of WTC and was responsible for all day-to-day decisions of the company. Ward, on
behalf of the company, contracted with Robert Burns to dispose of the PCB oil. With Ward's
knowledge, Burns dumped the oil at Fort Bragg Military Reservation and along North Carolina
roadsides. Eventually, Ward and Burns were convicted for unlawful disposal. 618 F. Supp. at 890910.
Although WTC contracted for disposal with Bums, Ward was held personally liable for cleanup
costs as a "person who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)
(1986). The Court noted that Ward personally participated in securing the disposal contract. (Ward
also personally benefitted from the contract because some of the contract proceeds to Burns, in turn,
were paid to Ward on a $55,000 debt Burns owed Ward). The court held that any corporate officer
who was personally involved in arranging for hazardous waste disposal is liable for cleanup costs,
as a "person who arranged .... " 618 F. Supp. at 894. Personal liability for Ward was consistent
with traditional corporate and tort law because corporate officers are personally liable for the torts
they commit on behalf of their company. 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 845 (1940).
See also NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d at 744; United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913-14
(D.N.H. 1985) (motion for summary judgment of generator's president, treasurer, sole shareholder,
denied because fact issues remained regarding the officer as a person who arranged for disposal of
hazardous waste).
Notably, the Ward Court rejected the United States' theory that both Ward and WTC were
liable as hazardous facility owners or operators under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1986). The government's
attempt to call Ward and WTC "operators" of the North Carolina roadsides was termed by the
court "a tortured maze of legal reasoning," "inventive," and "mental gymnastics." 618 F. Supp.
at 884. Similarly, in NEPACCO II, the Eighth Circuit rejected the theory that NEPACCO officers
were owners or operators of the Denney farm hazardous site where NEPACCO dumped dioxin. 810
F.2d. at 743. These courts recognize that generator liability under Superfund is not interchangeable
with owner/operator liability. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
29. 18 C.J.S. Corporations§ 580 (1939). A "piercing" analysis requires a court to decide if the
shareholder(s) of a company has disregarded the legal separateness of the corporate entity, such that
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hazardous sites are directly liable under the owner/operator provision of CERCLA, without piercing the corporate veil of the site-owning company. ° This
judicial approach appears unjustified.
For example, in State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the hazardous
waste disposal site at issue was owned by Shore Realty Corporation. In turn,
Shore Realty was owned by one Donald LeoGrande.11 The court found both
Shore Realty Corp. and LeoGrande liable for New York's response costs, and
for common law nuisance abatement expenses, in cleaning up the site.3 2 Shore
Realty Corp. was held liable as a current site owner under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). 33
The court also found LeoGrande personally liable as an "owner or operator."
To support this conclusion, the Second Circuit noted that the definition of
"persons," who may be owners or operators under the statute, specifically
includes individuals.3 4 Further, the court recognized the statutory exception for a
non-managerial owner who "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest." 35 In the Shore Realty majority's opinion, the exception for
owners via security interests implied liability for a managing shareholder. 6 Finally,
the court concluded that personal liability for LeoGrande as an "operator" was
appropriate because he was "in charge of the operation of the facility . . .,,7
The Second Circuit's analysis of LeoGrande's personal liability is flawed.
The court first relied on the "owner" language in CERCLA to impose liability
on LeoGrande. In so doing, however, the court ignored the fact that it was
calling both Shore Realty Corp. and LeoGrande the "owner" of the site. Actually,
as a shareholder of Shore Realty Corp., LeoGrande is the owner of the owner
of the site. Under traditional corporate law, LeoGrande would not be liable
unless the plaintiff could prove that Shore Realty's corporate separateness had
been sufficiently ignored to justify piercing the corporate veil. The Shore Realty

the company is merely the instrumentality or alter ego of the owner. This decision is based on several
factors, including: (i) whether the owner disregarded statutory corporate formalities, such as holding
meetings and keeping minutes; (ii) whether the owner co-mingled company resources with personal
resources; and (iii) whether the company is drastically undercapitalized to meet its business ends. If
the foregoing are found, a court may conclude that the business is not a separate legal person from
its owner, so the owner should be liable for company obligations. See generally MoYE, THE LAw OF
CoRPoRATioNs 89-90 (1982).

30. See, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
Shore Realty].
31. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1037. The land was purchased for condominium development.
The site included five large tanks in a field, six smaller above and below-ground tanks, one tank
truck trailer, and two warehouses containing over 400 leaking drums of chemicals and contaminated
solids. Shore Realty Corp. employees called in State environmental assistance when the drums began
bursting and leaking. Id. at 1038, n.3.
32. Id. at 1044-45, 1050-52.
33. Id. at 1044. Shore Realty Corp. is liable as an owner regardless of the fact that some of
the waste disposed on the property was dumped by unauthorized tenants. The court explained that
responsible parties will be liable, without proof of causation or contribution. Id. at 1044-45. See also
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. 759 F.2d at 1052, citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1986).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1986). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. 759 F.2d at 1054. Under the state law nuisance theory, the court found LeoGrande was
liable as an officer who controlled corporate tortious conduct. The court admitted that LeoGrande's
common law liability as a shareholder "is debatable" because facts sufficient to pierce the corporate
veil '.'are probably insufficiently particularized." Id. at 1052.
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Court, however, never acknowledged the issue of piercing the corporate veil to
impose Superfund liability on LeoGrande. Thus, the court mistakenly relied on
the "owner" language in the statute to impose direct personal liability on someone
who was not an owner of a site.
To support its finding of LeoGrande's liability as an owner, the Shore Realty
Court relied on the statutory exception for those who hold title to property to
protect a security interest.3 8 Apparently, the majority believed that since totally
passive owners of site property, such as mortgagees, are exempted from liability,
then, by inference, managerial shareholders must be liable under the statute. The
court's reliance on the security interest exception is unjustified. First, the Shore
Realty Court ignores the fact that the security interest exception applies to those
who hold a security interest for the hazardous waste site property itself. In
contrast, LeoGrande held an interest, as a shareholder, in a company that owned
a waste site. LeoGrande did not hold an interest in the site property.
Further, as authority for its interpretation of the security interest exception,
the Second Circuit cited NEPACCO 1 9 In NEPACCO I, however, the individuals
held personally liable were shareholders and officers of generators, not shareholders of a site owner or operator.4 Considering that the Eighth Circuit in
NEPACCO II subsequently rejected personal liability for the individual defendants
based on CERCLA's owner/operator provision, the Shore Realty majority's
reliance on NEPACCO for precedent regarding the owner/operator provision
4
seems misplaced. '
Finally, by relying on the security interest exception, the Shore Realty Court
glossed over the fact that the exception expressly applies to a unique ownership
role-documentary financial "ownership" by a creditor. Any inferences drawn
from the exception, therefore, should be limited to that special class of owners
it covers. The language "without participating in the management ... holds an
indicia of ownership to protect his security interest . . ." might infer that secured
parties could lose their protected status if they interfered in the disposal activities
on the site property governed by their security interest.4 2 The exception does not,
however, justify courts' overlooking the actual legal ownership of site property
by a corporation, to bind its shareholders, when no security interest is involved.
Nothing in the security interest exception appears to justify the sort of implicit,
automatic corporate piercing the Shore Realty Court manufactures.
To buttress its conclusion as to LeoGrande's liability sans piercing, the
Second Circuit relied on the CERCLA "operator" language. It held "[i]n any
event, LeoGrande is in charge of the operation of the facility in question, and
as such is an 'operator' within the meaning of CERCLA. '43 The court cites no
authority to support its conclusion regarding CERCLA's meaning of "opera-

38.
39.

759 F.2d at 1052.

579 F. Supp. at 847-48.
40. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
41. See NEPACCO I1, 810 F.2d at 743-44. Like NEPACCO I, other cases finding personal
liability for a generator company's officers are mistakenly cited as authority for liability of a site
company shareholder under the owner/operator provision. See CCC, 628 F. Supp. at 420, citing
Ward and Motollo supra note 28.
42. See generally Rallison, supra note 24, at 608-11.
43. 759 F.2d at 1052.
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tor. " Based on the common meaning of the word, however, LeoGrande would
appear to qualify as an "operator," since "[a]ll corporate decisions and actions
were made, directed, and controlled by him." ' 4 This "operator" liability under
CERCLA is consistent with the court's finding of personal liability for LeoGrande
under New York nuisance law because LeoGrande was "a corporate officer who

controls corporate conduct" and, therefore, "is liable for the torts of the
corporation."46 Thus, the "operator"

language in CERCLA, not the "owner"

provision, may be the appropriate statutory basis for courts to impose individual
liability on managerial shareholders.4 7
An alternative approach to individual shareholder liability was reflected in
Joslyn Corporation v. T.L. James & Co., Inc." Joslyn Corporation was the

current owner of a contaminated site that the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ordered cleaned up under CERCLA. Joslyn sued T.L. James &
Co., which previously owned the Lincoln Creosoting Company. Allegedly, Lincoln
contaminated the site in question during its wood treatment/creosoting operations.
Joslyn also sued several T.L. James corporate officers, all as former owners or
49
operators of the hazardous creosoting/wood treating facility.

The Joslyn Court explicitly rejected the reasoning in cases like Shore Realty,
50
that found Superfund liability for shareholders and officers without piercing.
Rather, the court held that limited shareholder liability is firmly entrenched in
corporate law and should not be disregarded without specific legislative directive.
The Joslyn Court found CERCLA lacks any clear language or legislative history
to impose direct, personal liability on shareholders of CERCLA defendants. For
this reason, the court rejected direct liability for T.L. James & Co.5
44. The Clean Water Act, see supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text, imposes liability on
"persons in charge." See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)-(6) (1986). At least one court has held that a
corporate owner-operator (as well as an individual) can qualify as a "person in charge" because it
has the capacity to control or direct the pollution-causing activities. See Apex Oil Co. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976).
The court in NEPACCO I relied on Apex to conclude that "capacity to control" is relevant to
the CERCLA analysis of personal liability for shareholders of site owners or operators. 579 F. Supp.
at 848-49. In so doing, the NEPACCO I Court ignored that Apex only represents the narrow
conclusion that a "person in charge" under the WPCA includes a corporate person. Apex concluded
nothing regarding liability of shareholders for the activities of their corporation, as the NEPACCO
I Court's reliance would indicate.
NEPACCO I has spawned subsequent analyses of a shareholder's "capacity to control" for the
purposes of CERCLA "owner/operator" liability. See, e.g., CCC, 628 F. Supp. at 420; State of
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986). CERCLA gives no guidance
whether this "capacity to control" approach is relevant or appropriate under the owner/operator
provision. Considering NEPACCO M held that liability for the NEPACCO defendants was not
justified under the owner/operator language, however, any further reliance on NEPACCO I as
support for shareholder liability under the owner/operator provision is inappropriate.
45. 759 F.2d at 1038.
46. Id. at 1052.
47. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
48. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), af'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
49. 696 F. Supp. 222-24. The court's opinion is limited to motions to dismiss by T.L. James &
Co., on the grounds that the Lincoln Creosoting Co., not its shareholder, was the owner of the site
at the time of contamination. The opinion does not address the personal liability of the officers of
T.L. James & Co.
50. Id. at 224-25 n.4.
51. Id. at 225-26. The court went on to absolve T.L. James & Co. of any liability based on a
traditional piercing analysis that examined corporate formalities, capitalization, and independent
financial record keeping. Id. at 230-31.
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Shore Realty and Joslyn thus represent competing views on the issue of
personal liability for shareholders of CERCLA site owners and operators. As
stated, the reasoning in the Shore Realty opinion is flawed on the "owner" issue
- although the court's personal liability finding for the shareholder may be
justified if the CERCLA "operator" provision is equated with traditional tort
liability for corporate officers. Joslyn reflects the traditional corporate law
approach to shareholder liability, which requires sufficient facts to pierce the
corporate veil before a corporation's owners will be liable for the corporation's
acts.
An additional line of cases is relevant to arriving at a consistent treatment
for shareholders of Superfund sites. These cases analyze whether a federal court
can assert personal jurisdiction over the CERCLA defendant's shareholder, when
the shareholder is not a resident of the forum state. 2 In general, before a federal
court can impose judgment on any defendant, it must establish personal jurisdiction over that defendant, through valid service of process.5 3 If the defendant
is not a resident of the forum state, the federal court will serve process on the
non-resident pursuant to the forum state's long-arm statute. s4 Further, due process
requires the defendant must have had some minimum contacts with the forum
state, so that appearing before the court in that forum does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.)5
Several courts have analyzed the issue of whether they can exercise jurisdiction
over non-resident shareholders of companies that operate hazardous sites.56 Like
LeoGrande in Shore Realty or T.L. James & Co. in Joslyn, these potential
CERCLA defendants were prosecuted for response costs because they allegedly
owned and operated a hazardous site. In each case, the only contact these
shareholders - also corporations themselves - had with the forum was ownership
of the resident defendant that operated the site. 7 The plaintiffs' exclusive basis
52. See State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill C., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho); United States v. Bliss,
108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo.
1985). In Bliss, the non-resident defendants were affiliates in the Syntex corporate family. Syntex
Corporation was the holding company for all the members of the conglomerate. Syntex U.S.A. was
its wholly-owned subsidiary and the parent corporation of Syntex Agribusiness. Syntex U.S.A. was
the successor in interest of Hoffman-Taft, Inc., the former owner of the hazardous site at issue. At
the time of the litigation, Syntex Agribusiness was the present site owner. Syntex U.S.A. and Syntex
Corporation were pursued as CERCLA "owners" based on their aff'ilation with Agribusiness. See
108 F.R.D. at 130-31.
Wehner and Bliss deal with the same hazardous site and the same defendants. Bliss is the
government's recovery action for response costs. Wehner is an action by a private plaintiff for
contribution from the Syntex group for its alleged share of the response costs borne by the plaintiff.
53. See generally 2 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 4.41-1 (1989).
54. Some federal statutes authorize nationwide service of process for the federal courts. CERCLA
does not so provide, at least for cost recovery actions. See, e.g., Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 29. At
least one court has held that CERCLA does provide nationwide service of process for abatement
actions, but not for cost recovery actions. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 137. If nationwide service of process
applied to the cost-recovery action, the minimum contacts of the defendant necessary to satisfy due
process would be with the entire United States, not just the forum state. Id. (citing F.T.C. v. Jim
Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir. 1979)).
55. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665, 670; Wehner, 616 F. Supp. 27, 29. In Bliss, the only basis
for jurisdiction over Syntex Corporation was the activities of its subsidiary Agribusiness, the present
owner of the site property. The basis for jurisdiction over Syntex U.S.A. was its succession in interest
to the assets of the original site owner, Hoffman-Taft, Inc. 108 F.R.D. 127, 132-33.
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for jurisdiction was the activities of the site-operating subsidiary within the
5
jurisdiction. 1
In each case, the courts correctly analyzed the relationship between the parent
and the subsidiary to determine if the parent was sufficiently involved in the
subsidiary's activities in the forum state to establish the requisite minimum
contacts. Essentially, the courts conducted a piercing-type analysis, deciding if
the traditional legal separateness between the parent and the subsidiary had been
sufficiently breached by the parent. If so, the court exercised jurisdiction over
the parent based on the parent's involvement in the subsidiary's activities in the
forum state.
In State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., the court found sufficient domination
of the non-resident parent corporation, Gulf Resources and Chemical Corp.
("Gulf"), over the resident site-operating subsidiary to exercise jurisdiction over
Gulf. Among other things, Gulf approved all pollution-related expenditures by
Bunker Hill Co. in excess of $500, Bunker Hill Co.'s authorized capital was only
$1100, while its dividends to Gulf in a six-year period totaled $27 million.
Moreover, Gulf approved all of Bunker Hill Co.'s capital expenditures and could
overrule all transactions or management decisions made by Bunker Hill Co. 59
For the foregoing reasons, the court found that "Gulf's activities with respect
to Bunker Hill, its control of management and operations and its overall contacts
with this State render it personally subject to the jurisdiction of this court." °
On the other hand, in Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., the piercing
analysis regarding Syntex Corporation and its site-owning subsidiary, Syntex
Agribusiness, resulted in the court dismissing the actions against the shareholder. 6
The Wehner Court emphasized that traditional corporate law treats corporations
separate from their owners, even when the owner is the sole shareholder. This
same rule applies to determine jurisdiction over the non-resident shareholder of
a resident CERCLA defendant subsidiary. 62 In the relationship between Syntex
Corporation and Syntex Agribusiness, corporate separateness remained intact.
Agribusiness established its own budget, prices and production. It raised its own
capital and kept separate financial records. 63 The few intermingled operations of
the parent and subsidiary were deemed normal incidents of a corporate parent's
ownership of a subsidiary and did not warrant piercing to establish jurisdiction."
These jurisdiction cases illustrate the inconsistency of the court's approach
in Shore Realty, whereby it found liability without piercing. If a court has
jurisdiction over a defendant because it is a resident of the forum state, the court
can automatically impose liability, under the Shore Realty analysis. Conversely,
for the purpose of deciding whether or not it will be subject to the court's

58.

Id.

59. 635 F. Supp. at 670.
60. Id. Alternatively, the court held that Gulf was estopped to deny jurisdiction because the
same court previously had exercised jurisdiction over Gulf in another matter regarding Bunker Hill's
pollution-causing activities. Id. at 671.
61. Wehner, 616 F. Supp. at 30. The action of the United States against Syntex Corporation
was also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 132.
62. 616 F. Supp. at 29.
63. Id. at 30.
64.

Id.
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jurisdiction, the non-resident defendant gets the benefit of a full-blown piercing

analysis. If the court cannot pierce the corporate veil, the case against the nonresident defendant is dismissed.
Thus, under the Shore Realty approach, the standard for liability (no piercing)
is lower than the standard for jurisdiction, where piercing is required. In practice,
shareholder liability under CERCLA may hinge on the citizenship of the shareholder. Clearly, this dichotomy does not serve any public policy under corporate
65
law or CERCLA.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The real justification for LeoGrande's liability in Shore Realty was his
participation in operating the hazardous site. 66 Unfortunately, the court's opinion
appears to equate management with ownership, when it found LeoGrande liable
as a site owner. Potentially, this approach creates an overly-broad precedent,
whereby any shareholder may be liable, without regard to his participation in
management, solely because of his ownership role.
If stock ownership is all that is required to trigger liability under CERCLA's
owner/operator provision, myriad non-managerial shareholders could become
liable for site cleanups. Such potential responsible parties could include stock
purchasers on the open market, employees under employee stock ownership plans,
pension plan trustees, and mutual funds. Clearly, this open-ended liability is
unjustified, even under a broad, remedial statute like CERCLA.
The Shore Realty type of analysis and outcome must be shifted away from
the "owner" justification, to instead emphasize the "operator" as the responsible
party. "Owner" liability should be limited to the actual owner of the site. It
should not be extended to shareholders of corporations that own sites, unless the
court finds reason to pierce the corporate veil. Then, and only then, can
"operator" liability be extended to include any person, corporate or individual
(including shareholders, directors, officers, managerial employees or independent
67
contractors) who participated in site operations.

65. The CERCLA personal jurisdiction cases have all dealt with corporate parents of whollyowned subsidiaries. Presumably, an individual shareholder, who is also an officer always will have
the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state where the site operates because of his role in
managing the site-operating corporation. At least one commentator argues that corporate shareholders
of site-owning companies (as opposed to individuals) more often should be liable as CERCLA owner/
operators because limited liability for parent corporations "would promote overly risky hazardous
waste disposal activities by encouraging corporations to place hazardous waste operations in the
Note, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor Hazardous
hands of poorly capitalized subsidiaries ....
Waste Clean-Up and Damages, 99 HAv. L. Rv. 986, 1002 (1986). A traditional piercing analysis,
however, such as that done by the court in Bunker Hill, supra notes 59 and 60 and accompanying
text, that takes into account factors such as undercapitalization, could yield liability for any
shareholder, without making generalized distinctions between individual and corporate shareholders.
An analysis that focuses on shareholder participation in site operations also could yield more uniform
and justifiable results. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
67. Admittedly, the Shore Realty Court relied on this operator argument as an alternative
justification for its conclusion. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Actually, it is the only
sound justification. Recently, courts have relied on Shore Realty to find CERCLA liability for
corporate parents whose subsidiaries owned and operated cleanup sites. See, e.g., United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Allied Chemical Corp. No.
83-5896-FMS (N.D. Calif. June 27, 1990). In each case the courts relied on Shore Realty's "operator"
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The focus on the operator role of potential CERCLA defendants eliminates
the resident/non-resident dichotomy for shareholders. If a resident shareholder
of a site-owning corporation is not participating in site operations, he would not
be liable without piercing. Thus, the resident shareholder would get the same
benefit of the piercing analysis that the non-resident gets for jurisdictional
purposes. Further, any resident or non-resident who participated in site management, presumably would have sufficient contacts with the site's forum state to
be subject to jurisdiction and liability as a site operator.
Furthermore, the focus on the operational role of a defendant, rather than
ownership, would revive cases such as NEPACCO" and Wards as important
precedents. The "generator" cases that found shareholders, officers and directors
alike liable, focused on these individuals' proactive roles as persons who arranged
for disposal. The facts in these cases could provide helpful analogies for courts
that must decide what level of activity dictates that a person is a site "operator."
Whereas liability of a person who arranged for disposal is irrelevant to liability
of a site owner, it clearly could be relevant to finding liability of individuals
operating a site. Further, cases analyzing torts 70committed by agents could be
helpful and relevant in the "operator" analysis.
From a public policy perspective, the Shore Realty decision may be completely
justifiable. The Second Circuit's principal justification for LeoGrande's liability,
however, - LeoGrande's "ownership" of a hazardous site - is legally unsupportable. On the contrary, the Joslyn Court correctly analyzed CERCLA's
ownership provision. 7 ' Fortunately, the statute's remedial purpose can be served
with defensible legal opinions regarding liability for shareholders and site owners.
If the site owner is a corporation, its shareholders may be liable, as shareholders,
through a traditional corporate piercing analysis. All other individuals, or corporate persons, can be liable for site cleanups if their participation in site
operations qualify them as site operators. In sum, this is the analysis courts
should apply hereafter.

analysis to support liability of the corporate parent, based on its level of involvement in the siteowning subsidiary or in the hazardous facility itself. In fact, the Kayser-Roth Court distinguishes
Joslyn from its analysis because Joslyn "is concerned primarily with owner rather than operator
liability." 910 F.2d at 27. Arguably, Shore Realty should be limited to the issue of "operator"
liability for shareholders and Joslyn should govern "owner" liability.
68. See supra notes 20-21, 28 & 39-41 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
70. The analysis proposed here, however, would be based on the defendant's participation in
site management, which may or may not be tortious. Simple participation probably should suffice
for operator liability since responsible parties are strictly liable. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, some site operations may be neglectful and, thus, the agent tort cases
could be instructive.
71. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

